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Perhaps no other topic in the arena of Illinois labor and employment relations is so 
divisive and, therefore, so subject to passionate misinformation, as the current state 
of public safety employee pension funds. The debate appears endless with alleged 
“facts” and “common sense” solutions permeating everything from local media to the 
State Legislature to police squad rooms and firehouse kitchen tables throughout our 
great state. Such hyperbole not only muddies the water but obstructs real and 
meaningful discussion. This article separates facts from fiction hoping that 
interested parties may discuss and debate without distraction. 
A common complaint in Illinois politics is that public pension systems are crippling 
the state financially and that only drastic action, such as cutting assertedly-generous 
benefits, can restore the state’s fiscal health. This article explains that public 
pensions in Illinois pay out relatively modest benefits, which generate economic 
activity roughly equal to what is paid. Further, the pension funds have made every 
payment and weathered every economic downturn during the past 100 years. Thus, 
there is not a “crisis” demanding a drastic emergency solution. This article reviews 
the Illinois pension system, refutes assertions made by critics, and explains the 
statistics critics use to shock audiences. This article sets forth the true state of 
pensions in Illinois: while there is not a crisis, there is a structural problem in that 
the funds do not have enough money. The leading cause of this fact, by far, is that 
plan sponsors have systematically underfunded the pension system. 




In late 2019, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed into law Public Act 101-0610 
(“Consolidation Law”), which concerns Article 3 and 4 pension systems, the focus of 
this article. The Consolidation Law transferred investing assets and authority 
previously held by each Article 3 and 4 fund to two statewide Pension Investment 
Funds, to obtain higher returns on investment. The Consolidation Law also will 
terminate each municipality’s power to hire its own actuary to calculate its annual 
contribution. Finally, the Consolidation Law reversed some previous changes that 
decreased benefits for employees hired after January 1, 2011. This article examines 
those changes. This article also discusses ongoing challenges that Article 3 and 4 
funds face, including each fund’s relationship with its municipality and the 
mechanisms by which a fund may secure the money that municipality owes. 
 
II. PENSIONS IN ILLINOIS 
 
A. The Perception 
 
Illinois’ public employee pension funds are often represented as being on the brink 
of failure. Those funds are described with language such as “crisis”1 and “pension-
bomb.”2 A typical article from a critic implies that one or more public bodies in 
Illinois, or Illinois itself, owe(s) a very large and scary amount of money to a pension 
fund as if it is a traditional type of debt, and then makes clear that the taxpayer is “on 
the hook” for it.3 For example, one article noted that “[f]or more than 50 years, state 
leaders have failed to deal with a slow-burning disaster that has taxpayers on the 
hook for $133.5 billion,”4 resulting in pension debt that is “devouring all else in state 
government.”5 A Bloomberg article asserted that pension debts amounted to 
“$11,000 for every man, woman, and child” in Illinois.6 Critics often attribute 
dramatic consequences to the state’s pension debt: it “threatens to swallow the state 
budget and suffocate Illinois’ economy.”7 An Illinois Policy Institute (“IPI”) report 
asserted that the situation would lead to “crushing the state’s economy with more tax 
hikes.”8 
 
These dire diagnoses are invariably followed by the argument that the only way to 
“save” the State of Illinois is to diminish pension benefits.9 To further support this 
action, critics often decry the supposed generosity of pension benefits. For example, 
another IPI article claimed that “[m]ore than 129,000 Illinois public pensioners” will 
receive $1 million or more in benefits.10 The article refers to these recipients as 
“pension millionaires,” the state’s 1%, a “small, powerful and protected class of 
wealth” whose profits are “immense.”11 The article further asserts that “the state’s 
social safety net has been gutted to pay for their privileges,”12 which assumes that a 
“social safety net” is what the money would be used for if pensions were 
unconstitutionally diminished.13 
 




The Illinois Constitution protects the pensions of public employees.14 Some critics 
have claimed that the “crisis” is so extreme that Illinois must amend its constitution 
to remove the pension protection clause, which could allow lawmakers to reduce 
pension benefits for long serving employees already in the system with the stroke of 
a pen.15 Others propose legislation that would de facto reduce benefits in an attempt 
to circumvent the pension protection clause.16 One proposal would save less than 1 
percent of the current pension debt by freezing pay to individuals already on fixed 
incomes.17 
 
One critic-inspired law has already been enacted. Public Act 96-0889, which took 
effect January 1, 2011, created a “Tier Two” of pension benefits for employees whose 
employment started on or after that date.18 Those benefits were significantly lower 
than the benefits enjoyed by employees hired before that date.19 Public Act 96-0889 
did this by, inter alia, changing the final salary calculation, reducing survivor 
benefits, and decreasing cost of living allowances; some of these changes may have 
violated federal Social Security law.20 For Article 3 and 4 pension funds21—the focus 
of much of this article—the proportion of employees subject to these lower Tier Two 
benefits has steadily grown over time. Yet this lower benefit level has not increased 
Article 3 and 4 funds’ funding percentage,22 even before the stock market downturn 
associated with COVID-19. Between 2012 and 2017, the aggregate funded ratio for 
Article 3 funds dropped from 56.26% to 55.78%, and for Article 4 funds dropped 
from 55.56% to 55.10%.23 Lower future benefits should have increased the funded 
level, but they have not. The likely reason is that the lower benefits have been 
included in the actuarial valuations used to determine municipal contributions, so 
required (and actual) municipal contributions have decreased, i.e., the 
municipalities, who do not have IMRF-like forced contributions, have enjoyed the 
lower municipal contributions but have done very little to make up for their earlier 
missed contributions. Instead of improving funded ratios, Tier Two benefit 
reductions have taken benefits from future retirees and given that money to 
municipalities in the present. 
 
B. The Reality 
 
The hyperbolic rhetoric critics employ skews the debate and negatively affects the 
policymaking process.24 It provokes a false sense of emergency, disregards the 
history of the problem, and does not address what solutions are actually feasible.25 It 
has also led to illegal policy measures: one or more Tier Two alterations may have 
resulted in benefits so low they are in jeopardy of violating the social security safe 
harbor law.26 And while politicians recite that employees are not responsible for the 
pension system’s problems, they repeatedly ask those employees to bear the burden 
of resolving them through freezes, pay cuts, reductions to retirement and healthcare 
benefits, and other measures that place the lives of critical employees and the public 
at risk.27 





The reality is that there is no crisis, but it is easy to create the appearance of one. The 
metrics used to measure pension fund solvency, such as accrued unfunded liability 
and pension debt, are unfamiliar to the casual reader. They are generally appropriate 
and useful when properly understood. However, they generate large numbers that 
obscure the fact that pension funds in Illinois, despite being poorly funded, are 
generally solvent now and for the foreseeable future.28 Although there is a problem, 
there is not a crisis: any emergency mindset is not justified, and large numbers do 
not a crisis make. It would appear that critics are creating a “crisis” and then 
adhering to former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s doctrine of “never allow[ing] a 




The often-criticized Illinois pension recipients have not meaningfully caused or 
contributed to the underfunding that plagues the system.30 This is because “public 
pensions in Illinois are not significant outliers in terms of expense or generosity.”31 
In Illinois, state and local government work is “strongly associated with” incomes 
that are 13.5 percent less than comparable private sector employees,32 and 
employees with bachelors’ degrees earn 32 percent to 40 percent less than their 
private sector counterparts.33 Compared to state and local government employees in 
other states, pay and benefits for state and local government employees in Illinois 
are toward the middle of the pack,34 but slightly less than the national average.35 
Total compensation, including benefits, is lower in Illinois than in other high-income 
states, and even less than in neighboring states like Iowa and Minnesota.36 
Moreover, public-sector employees comprise just 13.2 percent of the Illinois 
workforce, lower than the national average of 15.1 percent.37 Illinois employees also 
contribute significantly to their pension fund: they pay more than 75 percent of the 
other states.38 Most other states do not cap pension benefits, but Illinois caps 
pension benefits at 75 percent of an employee’s final average salary.39 Illinois 
pension benefits themselves are in the middle of the pack, over $10,000 annually 
lower than the conservative “red states” of Texas and West Virginia.40 Overall, 
compared to other states, public employees in Illinois are in the top quarter of 
employees in terms of paying in to their pension systems, but in the bottom quarter 
in terms of the pension benefits they receive.41 And more Illinois employees are 
exempt from receiving social security benefits than the national average.42 There is 
little evidence that Illinois’ benefit structure accounts for Illinois’ pension debt when 
compared to other states with better-funded pension funds.43 
 
Additionally, public-sector retirees spend their money primarily in the local 
economy, which generates significant economic activity.44 A National Institute on 
Retirement Security (“NIRS”) study found that every dollar paid out in pension 
benefits in 2016 supported a national average of $1.41 in total economic output.45 In 




Illinois, the figure was $1.57.46 A University of Illinois Labor and Employment 
Program (“UILEP”) study found that Illinois pension benefit payments nearly pay for 
themselves.47 During the period studied, Illinois government entities paid $13.4 
billion in pension payments; retirees received an after-tax total of $12.22 billion; this 
resulted in $12.78 billion being injected into the Illinois economy.48 Cutting pension 
benefits would not only break promises to recipients, it would inflict collateral 
damage on the Illinois economy. 
 
2. The Real Problem 
 
If pension recipients in Illinois are not overpaid, is there a crisis? If so, why? And if 
not, where do the critics’ numbers come from? There is some degree of monetary 
shortfall in the pension system generally, due primarily to a history of inadequate 
contributions from plan sponsors.49 Government contributions have fallen short 
because government entities have simply chosen to contribute less than necessary. 
Government entities have also manipulated the actuarial assumptions used to 
calculate contributions, or have chosen actuaries who will do so, to push 
contributions into the future. An examination of this history, these methods, and 
these assumptions is necessary to understand the true fiscal health of Illinois 
pension funds and the potential impact of the new pension fund consolidation 
legislation. 
 
Pension fund contribution practices in Illinois have been inadequate for maintaining 
the health of the pension funds virtually from the start.50 One source analyzed 
Illinois pension laws dating back to 1916 and stated that “financial provisions [were] 
entirely inadequate for paying the stipulated pensions when due.”51 In 1959, a report 
stated, “Of principle concern to the Commission is the accumulation of large 
unfunded accrued liabilities resulting for the most part from the inadequacy of 
government contributions in prior years to meet increases in costs.”52 In 1973, a 
plan was enacted to have annual contributions mirror what the state pension funds 
would pay out that year.53 The General Assembly’s Pension Commission stated that 
this plan was “unacceptable since it result[ed] in a deferment of the burden of 
financing currently incurred benefit obligations to future generations of taxpayers.”54 
Later, Governor James Thompson committed the state to a plan of contributing only 
60% of estimated payouts to defer contributions.55 This “kick the can down the road” 
policy became Illinois’ de facto funding policy from 1982 to 1995.56 
 
Recent history is especially illuminating. In 1994, Illinois mandated that each 
pension fund be 90 percent funded by 2040 or 2045.57 This new plan prescribed 
even lower payments than the previous 1989 plan with which the state had already 
failed to comply.58 The timetable set by the 1994 plan—46 or 51 years—is twice as 
long as the 25-year period recommended under government accounting standards.59 
Such a long timetable adds billions of dollars in extra interest to what is already 




owed, especially where, as in Illinois, contributions are backloaded.60 Worse still, the 
plan is designed to allow the state’s overall pension debt to grow until 2029.61 
 
In 2003, with interest rates at historic lows, Illinois issued $10 billion in pension 
obligation bonds.62 While this was initially seen as a responsible move to reduce 
pension debt and payments, about $2 billion of the bond issuance was diverted away 
from pensions.63 In 2006 and 2007, Illinois granted a pension holiday.64 This 
allowed the legislature to not contribute the amount required by the 1994 funding 
plan; instead, it lowered its payment over that two-year-period to allow it to use the 
bonds as the sole form of payment.65 Pension bonds were sold again in 2010 and 
2011.66 This borrowing will add a total of $30.8 billion to the state’s pension debt.67 
 
The inadequacy of government contributions has been widely criticized. In its 2017 
Annual Financial Report, the Teachers’ Retirement System (“TRS”) wrote: “Since 
TRS was founded in 1939, the State of Illinois has never, in any year, funded the 
system at a level that standard actuarial practice would define as sufficient.”68 In its 
annual reports, the Illinois Commission on Government Forecasting and 
Accountability has consistently noted: 
The single largest cause—comprising just under 50 percent of the total growth in 
underfunding—was that the state’s contributions fell below the actuarially required 
level. No other single factor—investment returns, changes in actuarial assumptions, 
benefit increases, etc. —comprised more than 20 percent of the deterioration of 
funding status. 69 
Other calculations were even less flattering. One source concluded that from fiscal 
year 1985 to fiscal year 2012, over 47 percent of the growth in the State’s unfunded 
liabilities70 came from the shortfall in State contributions to the pension systems.71 
Another found that about 75 percent of the 2013 shortfall, then at $96 billion, was a 
result of the legislature failing to make contributions.72 A third source found that 
Illinois’ unfunded pension liabilities grew by $115 billion from 1996 to 2018; 
considering salary assumptions and benefit changes, benefit payments contributed 
less than 0.5 percent to that shortfall.73 This widespread underfunding has also 
played out with respect to public safety pension funds established under Article 3 
and Article 4 of the Pension Code, notwithstanding the fact that those entities are 
funded by municipalities.74 The simple refusal by political entities in Illinois to 
adequately contribute to pension funds is the single most decisive cause of the 
situation that faces Illinois today. 
But government entities also underfund pension funds more subtly, by manipulating 
actuarial assumptions. To understand these assumptions, one must first understand 
the actuarial methods by which a pension fund’s liabilities are calculated. This article 
thus addresses actuarial methods and discusses the calculation and relevance of the 
“big numbers” that critics often cite. This article then explains the importance of the 
actuarial assumptions used in calculating a funding obligation, and explores how 




funding entities tend to choose assumptions that reduce obligation in the short-term, 
regardless of the effect on their obligations in the long-term. 
 
C. Determining Funding 
 
1. Introduction and Terms 
 
A pension plan is a defined benefit plan, meaning that a retiree’s benefit is calculated 
by a defined, statutory formula based on his or her final salary and total years of 
service, irrespective of the amount of his or her contributions.75 The (projected) 
future benefits owed to current employees and retirees—including those who will not 
retire for 15, 20, or 25 years—are considered accrued or present liabilities on the 
pension fund’s balance sheet to the extent those benefits are attributable to the 
employee’s past or present service.76 
As to funding mechanisms, Article 3 and 4 pension funds have three sources of 
income. First, each employee pays a percentage of his or her salary into the pension 
fund.77 Second, the municipality78 contributes an amount calculated on an annual 
basis by an actuary.79 Some of these assets are invested consistent with Pension Code 
provisions; the returns on these investments are the third source of income for the 
pension fund.80 The remainder of the assets are held as cash and used to pay 
monthly benefits to retirees and other expenses.81 
The municipality’s contribution is calculated annually by an actuary.82 This actuary 
may be employed by the Illinois Department of Insurance or retained by the pension 
fund or the municipality.83 This calculation takes multiple present-day variables into 
account, such as the number and salaries of current employees.84 The actuary must 
also make actuarial assumptions about future events, such as the average number of 
years each employee will work, the average lifespan of each employee, department 
payroll growth, and investment returns.85  Each of these assumptions affects the 
calculation of the fund’s unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities; the present value of 
the future benefits to be paid to each employee after he or she retires; the portion of 
the present value attributable to past years, the current year, and future years; and 
other measures.86 A pension fund is considered fully funded with respect to an 
employee if it has enough assets to pay the portion of an employee’s anticipated 
retirement benefit attributable to the years he or she has already worked, at the time 
he or she works them.87 A pension fund is considered fully funded overall if it meets 
this standard with respect to all employees and retirees. 
The following definitions may be helpful:  




• Present Value of Future Benefits: The present-day dollar value of 
benefits that will be paid in the future to current participants who are 
active, retired, or terminated vested.88 
o Actuarial Accrued Liability: Portion of Present Value of Future 
Benefits allocated to prior years.89 
o Normal Cost: Portion of Present Value of Future Benefits allocated to 
the current year.90  
o Future Normal Cost: Portion of Present Value of Future Benefits 
allocated to future years.91  
• Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liabilities: The difference between the 
Actuarial Accrued Liability and the actuarial value of the pension fund’s 
accrued assets.92 This article refers to this measurement as “unfunded 
liability” or “pension debt.”93 When the accrued assets are divided by the 
Actuarial Accrued Liability and expressed as a percentage, this is referred 
to as the “funding percentage” or “X percent funded.” 
 
“Actuarial accrued liability,” “normal cost,” and “future normal cost” can be 
visualized as past, present, and future boxes. Each year an individual works creates 
greater benefit (and greater liability for the pension fund) that accrues that year: this 
is the second box, the normal cost.94 The benefit accrued from work in previous years 
is the first box, which represents actuarial accrued liability.95 This is a liability on the 
fund’s balance sheet regardless of when the employee will retire, whether the 
benefits come payable two or twenty-five years later. The third box represents the 
future normal cost—the benefits that will be earned by the employee’s future work.96 
As the individual continues to work, the past box will get bigger and the future box 
will get smaller.97 
 
2. Actuarial Cost Method 
 
The method used to calculate the present value of future benefits, the unfunded 
actuarial accrued liabilities, and other measures is referred to as the actuarial cost 
method.98 There are two actuarial cost methods common to Article 3 and 4 pension 
funds; they often yield dramatically different results.99 One method is the “projected 
unit credit” (“PUC”) method and the other is the “entry age normal” (“EAN”) 
method.100 For EAN, normal cost is reflected as level percent of salary over an 
employee’s career.101 This creates a level contribution obligation for the funding 
entity.102 By contrast, for PUC, normal cost typically increases as a participant gets 
closer to retirement age.103 This creates an upward funding curve in the later years of 
an employee’s career and backloads the required contributions attributable to that 
employee.104 Thus, compared to EAN, the PUC method prescribes lower 
contributions initially, but those contributions increase above EAN levels over the 
employee’s career.105 
 




3. Amortizing Pension Liabilities 
 
When a pension fund has unfunded liabilities, as all funds in Illinois do, the 
legislature can require (and has required) the pension fund to reach a certain 
funding percentage at a certain time. This is the 90 percent funded by 2040 
requirement imposed in 1994.106 To achieve this, pension debt is amortized and a 
portion of it included in the pension fund’s yearly request to the municipality until it 
is paid off.107 The request to the municipality for an Article 3 or 4 fund is usually 
calculated by adding the normal cost for the coming year to the amortized portion of 
the amount necessary for the fund to reach 90 percent funded by 2040.108 
 
Pension debt can be amortized as Level Percentage of Payroll or Level Dollar.109 
Where payroll growth is zero percent, the two amortization methods yield the same 
contribution amounts.110 However, where payroll growth is greater than zero, the 
Level Percentage of Payroll method decreases the contribution requirement in the 
near future but increases the requirement in the long-term.111 This creates a funding 
ramp, similar to the PUC method, in which liability increases year over year.112 By 
contrast, under the Level Dollar method, the same dollar amount of pension debt is 
paid every year during the amortization period.113  
 
4. Other Assumptions 
 
An actuary must make two other assumptions: the rate of return the pension fund 
will achieve on its investments, and the life expectancy of active members and 
retirees.114 These assumptions, especially expected rate of return, are often discussed 
by critics and informed the Consolidation Law passed in December 2019.115 If a 
higher expected rate of return is set, it is assumed that more money will be made 
from investments in the future, which lowers the amount a municipality must 
contribute in the present. By contrast, lowering the assumed rate of investment 
return by a quarter of a percentage point (from 6.75 percent to 6.5 percent) was 
estimated to increase municipalities’ contributions for public safety funds by 
between 16 percent and 22 percent.116 Finally, life expectancy assumptions work 
intuitively. If a shorter life expectancy is assumed, the required municipal 
contribution is lower.117  
 
D. Misstatements and Manipulation Explained 
 
The actuarial calculations detailed above—though, again, wholly appropriate in the 
correct context—generate the huge numbers critics use to create a sense of panic. 
Recall that pension debt represents the benefits a fund owes for past service 
regardless of when those payments will be made. This measure does not distinguish 
between the payments a pension fund must make next month and those it must 
make next decade. While it would be salutary for a pension fund to hold assets equal 




to all obligations that have been incurred, the failure of a pension fund to hold such 
assets is not cause for panic or an indictment of its fiscal health. The same holds true 
if a pension fund has a funded ratio of less than 100 percent. Such a fund could easily 
make payments for years. A lower funding ratio means that investment returns will 
be lower, pushing future contributions higher.118 But ultimately, pension debt does 
not represent the danger of missing a payment. As Bill Atwood, executive director of 
the Illinois State Board of Investment, stated, “I would say that the likelihood of 
Illinois plan participants not getting their retirement benefits is highly remote.”119 
 
To take a real-world example, a report prepared by the actuarial firm Foster & Foster 
found that as of January 1, 2019, the Hoffman Estates Firefighters’ Pension Fund 
held $84,436,992 in assets, but also had a total accrued liability of $139,313,876.120 
That pension fund, therefore, had $54.8 million in pension debt and was 60.6 
percent funded.121 These numbers are eye-catching and work to the critics’ 
advantage.122 Hoffman Estates is a suburb with just over 50,000 people and a 
poverty rate of less than 5 percent.123 An unfamiliar reader could easily be led to 
believe that Hoffman Estates residents each owe $1,000 that should be paid now to 
bring the pension fund into compliance with what it owes, or that pensioners stand 
to receive only 60.6 percent of their promised benefits, or that some other economic 
catastrophe is looming. And, the unfamiliar reader would note, Hoffman Estates is in 
no way economically disadvantaged. But the truth is that the Hoffman Estates 
Firefighters Pension Fund is nowhere near missing (or reducing) any benefit 
payments. This is a healthy fund. It maintains $84.4 million in assets and pays out 
approximately $5.3 million in benefits annually.124 While fewer assets mean fewer 
investment opportunities, this fund is nowhere near insolvency. 
 
Additionally, an unfamiliar reader would likely conceive of pension debt as similar to 
a home or car loan, as a fixed amount with a fixed payment that he or she will, at 
some point, pay down to zero (and the sooner the better). One would not look at a 
mortgage statement and say, “Wow, I owe $300,000 on my house and my yearly 
salary is only $75,000; this is a crisis!” because one will pay that amount over a long 
period of time. Just as this individual can meet his or her bills as they come due, the 
pension funds in Illinois, despite decades of underfunding, can make their necessary 
benefit payments.125 
 
Looking to the unfunded liability at a single point in time as the only indicator or 
measure of the health of a pension system is disingenuous, overly simplistic, and 
obscures the many layers of nuance that play into this figure and what it means.126 
Low or decreased funding levels say very little about a public pension fund’s long-
term stability.127 For this and other reasons, an emphasis on eliminating pension 
debt quickly is not recommended by economists.128 Yet a “crisis” narrative has 
arisen, possibly from a misunderstanding about what funding ratios reveal about a 
pension system’s financial stability.129 Again, the terminology used also plays a part. 
“Unfunded liabilities,” for example, is “an ominous new catchphrase . . . that is 




rooted in financial fallacy.”130 Another factor giving the appearance of a “crisis” is the 
accounting standards governing public pension plans.131 In addition to generating 
large, frightening numbers,132 the Government Accounting Standards Board 
(“GASB”) accounting standards misrepresent the health of public pension funds by 
resting on a false assumption.133 GASB calculates pension debt based on the 
question, if the pension fund closed tomorrow, how much would be needed to pay 
out all the promised benefits until the last member dies?134 This question is pivotal in 
the private sector where plan sponsors go bankrupt, but it has no application in the 
public sector where plan sponsors can levy taxes to fulfill their funding obligations.135 
The GASB standards fail to measure progress toward providing benefits when they 
are due, exaggerate the problems facing pension funds, steer legislatures toward 
misguided solutions, and cost taxpayers and the economy far more than they purport 
to save.136 Any clarity the GASB standards bring “comes at the expense of making the 
situation seem much more dire than necessary” by ignoring or undermining the 
value of the pension plan.137 GASB standards also add billions of dollars to a 
government’s deficit.138 All of this unnecessarily increases tension over 
policymaking.139 
 
Funding ratios and pension debt should be one tool used to create a funding plan; 
they should not be used to frame the debate in a way that generates a widespread 
sense of urgency, creates a fear of insolvency, or results in rushed policy decisions 
addressing a crisis.140 After all, Illinois pensions have been criticized and deemed 
unsustainable for over 50 years and yet have resiliently weathered economic ebbs 
and flows.141 At the time of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, police and 
fire pensions were funded at 19 percent and 34 percent, respectively.142 Yet in the 
intervening years, not a single pension fund in Illinois has failed to make a payment 
due to an inability to pay. It is irresponsible to use pension debt as a scare tactic to 
imply a looming catastrophe that does not exist.143 
 
Under metrics other than “pension debt” and “funding percentage,” Illinois’ pension 
funds are doing well. The National Conference on Public Employee Retirement 
Systems (“NCPERS”) concluded that a pension fund’s fiscal health should be based 
upon 1) whether cash inlays from contributions and investment income exceeds 
benefit payments in a given year, and 2) whether there is a cushion to weather an 
economic downturn.144 Using 2016 data from all 50 states, NCPERS analyzed the top 
and bottom states represented by the average funding level of the state’s pension 
funds.145 It then compared the four best-funded state funds to the four worst-funded 
state funds and examined the number of years in which cash inflows were less than 
cash outflows—in other words, how often was there a negative cash flow?146 Illinois 
was among the worst states in terms of average funding level.147 However, NCPERS 
found no significant difference between the best- and worst-funded states in terms of 
frequency of negative inflow years.148 Regardless of funding level, each of the eight 
states had between five and eight years in which pension fund income was less than 
annual benefits paid, i.e., negative cash flow years.149 Despite having one of the four 




lowest funding ratios, pension funds in Illinois were tied with three other states’ for 
the fewest years of negative cash flow.150 It had fewer instances of negative cash flow 
than the highest funded state, Wisconsin.151 Year by year, Illinois pension funds take 
in sufficient assets to operate and pay benefits, notwithstanding a lower overall 
funded level. Finally, addressing public pensions nationally, the study concluded, 
“[F]unding status has little correlation with a pension fund’s ability to pay the 
promised benefits.”152 The study further concluded, “If left intact, public pension 
plans are sustainable, as they have been for decades. . . . Their assets now are higher 
than ever before.”153 Thus, regardless of their funding levels, pension funds can 
continue to meet obligations in perpetuity so long as they remain cash flow 
positive.154 The large, scary numbers thrown around by critics do not stand up to 
scrutiny, and the facts do not establish a problem of the magnitude they suggest. 
 
Rather than a crisis, Illinois has a fundamental, long-term problem: it has not 
funded its pension obligations. Often the plan sponsor has simply refused to 
contribute amounts called for by actuarial principles.155 However, plan sponsors 
have also frequently manipulated the actuarial assumptions and methods described 
above, or have found an actuary to do that, in order to defer contributions into the 
future. The obvious winner in such a situation is the public figure who reduces taxes 
or increases spending elsewhere. This imposes a real cost on future public officials, 
residents, and the pension funds themselves that is generally ignored.  
 
However, when a fund is less than 100 percent funded, there is a real cost. That fund 
has less money to invest, which leads to a lower return on investment. Ironically, the 
result is that plan sponsors have to contribute more money in the future to make up 
for the shortfalls of the past. Illinois plan funders are constantly on the wrong side of 
an “a stitch, in time, saves nine” scenario. And though they are far from the only 
offenders, it is worth noting that pension critics who fret about the long-term 
solvency of the system rarely advocate for aggressive funding plans that would 
benefit future generations out of proportion to any fiscal burden imposed in the 
present. 
 
As mentioned, unfortunately, certain municipalities have manipulated actuarial 
assumptions to decrease their required contributions to the Article 3 and 4 funds. 
The financing provisions of Article 3 and 4 of the Pension Code provide a 
municipality a great degree of discretion in calculating its contribution to the 
pension funds each year.156 The Code states that the municipality shall levy a tax in 
an amount which, when combined with all other revenues, is equal to the normal 
cost of the pension fund for the year and the amortized amount which will bring the 
pension fund to 90 percent funded in 2040.157 The Code states that the 
municipality’s minimum contribution must be determined by an actuary employed 
by the Department of Insurance or retained by the pension fund or the municipality 
itself.158 The Code also specifies that the minimum contribution shall be calculated 
using the PUC method and the Level Percentage of Payroll method,159 the very 




problematic methods that create funding ramps and defer contribution requirements 
into the future. Municipalities can and do make contributions greater than this 
minimum, including by deferring to the determination of the pension fund’s retained 
actuary, but their right to retain their own actuary and to use the methods that 
minimize current contributions is explicitly written into the Pension Code.160 The 
municipality raises the necessary money by imposing a property tax.161 If the 
municipality fails to forward the necessary contributions, a pension fund may certify 
the amount due to the State Comptroller, who intercepts state money otherwise 
directed to the municipality and redirects it to the pension fund.162 But this process is 
time-consuming and takes a toll on fund-municipality relations.163 
 
In addition to using the PUC method and the Level Percentage of Payroll method, 
actuaries often manipulate assumptions related to the rate of return on investment 
and life expectancy. Article 3 and 4 pension funds fall into one of four sets of 
legislative restrictions as to what they can invest in, based on the overall value of 
their assets.164 Pension funds with fewer assets are subject to greater restrictions, 
which limits their possible return on investment.165 By setting a higher expected rate 
of return on investments, an actuary could reduce a municipality’s required 
contribution. For this reason, a decision by a pension board and its actuary to set a 
lower expected rate of return is not made lightly, and is made knowing that a 
municipality may balk at the greater liability the decision creates. When a booming 
market seems to justify a higher expected rate of return, a municipality is reluctant 
to lower it to a more realistic number even if the higher rate is not sustainable. 
Similarly, while actuaries generally rely on objective life expectancy tables and other 
sources to estimate life expectancy for each employee, retiree, and surviving spouse, 
actuaries can also produce outdated results. In one case, an actuary intentionally and 
wrongly “adjusted” mortality tables to understate future pension liabilities.166 While 
this case is not typical, it highlights the lack of uniformity surrounding these 
assumptions and the ability of a municipality or a pension board to “shop” for an 
actuary likely to produce a favorable outcome. 
 
E. Governor Pritzker’s 2019 Task Force 
 
Critics are wrong in their assessment of the causes of pension debt in Illinois and 
their continued proposals of faulty solutions. But one fact is clear: Illinois’ public 
pension funds are “among the worst-funded” in the nation.167 No governor can 
ignore that Illinois’ repeated decisions to defer pension fund contributions have 
created a situation which, while not a crisis, is untenable in the long-term. These 
decisions have decreased the investment returns the funds would have otherwise 
realized, necessitating increased municipal contributions. Thus, during his first year 
in office, Governor J. B. Pritzker formed a task force to analyze the possibility and 
impact of consolidating the investment assets of the 600 Article 3 and 4 pension 
funds.168 The individual funds’ abilities to gain returns on their investments is a 




frequently-discussed matter. Obtaining the highest return possible is, in the abstract, 
an uncontroversial way to improve the fiscal health of the system.169 Consolidating 
all assets, beyond those needed to pay benefits in the near future, might result in 
better investment returns and lower costs.170 
 
In its October 2019 report, the task force made two key recommendations.171 First, it 
recommended that the assets of Article 3 and Article 4 pension funds be consolidated 
into separate statewide authorities for investment purposes.172 Those assets would be 
managed by independent boards and invested in a way similar to the assets of the 
Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund.173 The task force recommended that, while the 
investments would be centrally invested, each fund would maintain an account of its 
own assets and liabilities with no fund assets used to pay for the benefits of another 
fund.174 The individual Article 3 and 4 funds (“Downstate Funds”) would continue to 
manage the administration of benefits, but the Task Force called for continued study 
of possible administration consolidation.175 
 
Second, the task force studied the aforementioned Tier Two benefit system that 
grants lower benefits to employees hired on or after January 1, 2011.176 The task force 
considered the possibility that the lower benefits might violate federal Social Security 
law.177 Some employees covered by a public pension plan in Illinois are not required 
to pay into the Social Security system, including almost all those covered by Articles 
3 and 4.178 The “safe harbor” regulation governing federal Social Security law179 
requires that such employees receive a retirement benefit from their public pension 
plan that is at least equal to the benefit they would receive under Social Security.180 If 
the benefit is not equal, the public employer is required to increase benefits to the 
level of Social Security, or enroll the employee in Social Security and pay retroactive 
contributions.181 As the Task Force Report noted, public employers’ liability would 
continue to grow if the Tier Two benefits were found to violate the safe harbor 
provision, and the accumulated liabilities would have to be repaid in a short time 
frame.182 To remedy this issue, the task force recommended increasing Tier Two 
benefits by changing calculations for final pensionable salary, cost of living 
allowances, and surviving spouse benefits in manners more favorable to 
employees.183 
 
III. PUBLIC ACT 101-0610 
 
Shortly after the pension task force released its report, the Illinois General Assembly 
passed a bill largely mirroring its proposals, which Governor Pritzker signed into law 
on December 18, 2019 as Public Act 101-0610 (“Consolidation Law”).184 The 
Consolidation Law created the Police Officers’ Pension Investment Fund and the 
Firefighters’ Pension Investment Fund (“Consolidated Funds”), thus accomplishing 
the consolidation contemplated in the Task Force Report.185 Each Consolidated Fund 
is charged with investing the assets of the Downstate Funds.186 By June 30, 2022, the 




Consolidated Funds will have taken custody of each Downstate Fund’s investment 
assets and authority resulting in an approximately $9.5 billion police pension fund 
and a $6.5 billion firefighter pension fund.187 The Consolidated Funds will invest 
those assets pursuant to less-restrictive provisions than those that governed the 
Downstate Funds.188 The method by which assets are returned to each Downstate 
Fund to pay benefits is not made clear but it is anticipated that the fund will develop 
operational procedures and guidelines to do so. 
 
Under the Consolidation Law, the Downstate Funds will still exist to perform all 
their other functions, including adjudicating disability cases, verifying continued 
eligibility for benefits, and formally accepting new members. Every Downstate Fund 
will have its own account with the Consolidated Fund.189 Investment gains and losses 
will be attributed to each Downstate Fund pro rata.190 Each Downstate Fund will not 
have access to the assets attributed to another Downstate Fund.191 The initial costs of 
consolidation will be financed by a $7.5 million loan to each Consolidated Fund from 
the Illinois Finance Authority.192 However, the assets held for investment purposes 
are held in accounts outside the State Treasury.193 
 
The Consolidation Law creates a transition period beginning on January 1, 2020, 
and ending June 30, 2022, by which time all Downstate Funds will have transferred 
their investment assets and investment authority to the appropriate Consolidated 
Fund.194 Before this transfer is made, each Consolidated Fund, through its Board of 
Trustees, will engage a certified public accountant to audit the investment assets of 
each Downstate Fund.195 Once a Downstate Fund’s assets are audited, the 
Consolidated Fund will provide it with a certified investment asset list and the 
Downstate Fund may not purchase or sell investment assets.196 Each Consolidated 
Fund’s executive director will later give notice to the Downstate Fund of the 
Consolidated Fund’s intent to assume control of the investment assets and the date it 
will do so.197 
 
As with the Article 3 and 4 funds, each Consolidated Fund will be governed by a 
Board of Trustees (“Board”).198 Each Board has nine trustees.199 Five of these are 
“employee-side,” being elected by employees or beneficiaries or appointed from lists 
provided by employee unions; the other four are “employer-side.”200 A simple 
majority of five votes is enough to pass most motions.201 However, establishing a 
quorum and passing certain important types of motions require six votes.202 The 
adoption of actuarial assumptions, asset allocation policies, and investment policies 
are among the crucial matters for which six votes are required.203 
 
Each Board has significant operational authority. The Consolidation Law gives each 
Board the authority to hire an investment manager.204 Additionally, each Board may 
hire an executive director in charge of its operation and administration.205 Each 
Board may also appoint one or more custodians for its assets.206 The Board or the 
executive director may also employ legal counsel, independent auditors, and other 




experts and set the compensation of those employed.207 Each Consolidated Fund is 
subject to an independent audit by a CPA selected by the Board six months after the 
end of the transition period,208 and each will be audited at least annually 
thereafter.209 
 
Several matters remain to be standardized in the operation of the funds; these 
include certain timelines such as when the auditing process will begin and details 
such as the order in which the Downstate Funds’ assets will be audited. The Boards 
must all address the mechanism by which they will distribute money to Downstate 
Funds to pay benefits,210 and whether municipal contributions shall be paid directly 
to the Consolidated Funds. The Consolidation Law gives each Board considerable 
rule-making authority, including regarding the transition process, transfer of funds 
to the Downstate Funds, and how municipal contributions “may, but are not 
required to, be directly transferred to the fund.”211 
 
Of course, the Consolidation Law exists primarily to change the law governing 
investment of Article 3 and 4 assets to obtain a higher rate of return. It addresses 
this by eliminating the investment restrictions that currently govern Article 3 and 4 
funds.212 Specifically, the Consolidation Law states that the Consolidated Funds shall 
not be subject to the limitations applicable to Article 3 and 4 funds that limited the 
Downstate Funds’ ability to invest more than 65 percent of their assets (or less for 
Downstate Funds with fewer assets) in equities.213 The Consolidation Law does 
impose some investment restrictions on the Consolidated Fund, but these are of a 
different nature.214 
 
Another significant provision of the Consolidation Law—and one not contemplated 
in the Task Force Report—is the removal of actuarial assumptions from the 
municipalities’ influence. The Consolidation Law accomplishes this by addressing 
the annual actuarial report used as the basis for the municipalities’ contributions to 
the Downstate Fund.215 It provides that after the transition period, the report used 
shall be the report prepared by an auditor engaged by each Consolidated Fund.216 
The Consolidation Law thus removes from each municipality the power to hire the 
actuary who makes the assumptions upon which the contribution demand is 
based.217 If a municipality was ever so inclined, it may no longer seek out actuaries 
who inappropriately reduce present-day municipal contributions by using certain 
assumptions. Instead, the new Consolidated Funds will use their own actuary to 
determine the required annual contribution for each municipality, thereby bringing 
a degree of objectivity and uniformity to the required assumptions.218 
 
Finally, the Consolidation Law corrects some of the harmful effects of the Tier Two 
benefit reduction. Most significantly, the Consolidation Law corrects the Tier Two 
benefits provision to avoid any potential federal Social Security law violation. Under 
Tier Two cost of living adjustments for pension recipients were limited to one-half of 
the consumer price index (“CPI”) or 3 percent, whichever was lower.219 The 




Consolidation Law changes this to the CPI itself or 3 percent, whichever is lower.220 
The Consolidation Law also increases benefits for survivors of Tier II pension 
recipients221 and changes the calculation of final pensionable salary in a way 
favorable to employees.222 
 
The Tier Two benefit enhancements are not projected to create great liability. The 
task force opined that the enhancements would cost less than 10 percent of the 
increased investment resulting from consolidation: 
While the fixes to Tier 2 benefits for suburban and downstate police and fire 
plans will have some associated cost, that cost is minimal in proportion to the 
improved investment returns resulting from consolidation. On average and 
over a five-year period, the recommended fixes to Tier 2 benefits are 
estimated to offset between $70 and $95 million of the $820 million to $2.5 
billion (3-9%) in investment return gains, and avoids a potential and costly 
safe harbor violation.223 
Data regarding these costs have not been compiled, other than in the Task Force 
Report, but it appears unlikely that the cost of the increased Tier Two benefits will 
exceed 10 percent of the expected gains from increased investment returns through 
consolidation.224 
The Consolidation Law could increase the overall funding levels of the Downstate 
Funds, both by obtaining a higher return on investment with the assets pooled,225 
and by saving significant costs on hiring individual investment managers.226 
However, giving control of the actuarial assumptions to each Board may have the 
most beneficial effect of all, as actuarial assumptions will no longer aid in the 
effective postponement of liabilities into the future.227 The fact that the task force 
report did not recommend this measure, but political leaders included it, may also 
indicate that there is now political willpower to confront the funding problem 
honestly in the present, instead of deferring it to the future. 
IV. CHALLENGES GOING FORWARD 
 
Public-sector employee pension systems in Illinois will face challenges going 
forward. Decades of underfunding cannot be undone with a single Consolidation 
Law. But the Law itself is an encouraging development. Challenges remain, however. 
Those challenges include a new global pandemic and the various strains of 




As this article is being written, the COVID-19 pandemic ravages the country. The 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (and other stock market indices) reflects the damage 
done to equities markets, falling from 29,276.82 on February 10, 2020228 to 




18,591.93 on March 23229 before rising to 25,383.11 on May 29.230 Article 3 and 4 
pension funds are permitted to invest up to 65 percent of their assets in equities,231 
and most do so to capture the greatest return on investment. Unfortunately, this 
means that most Article 3 and 4 pension funds have lost asset value and may 
continue to do so. Though not explicitly stated, it is likely, that the Consolidated 
Funds will invest more than 65 percent of investment assets in equities, rather than 
fixed income instruments such as government bonds.232 In that case, a future 
downturn like the one associated with COVID-19 would cause even more lost value 
to the Illinois pension system. 
 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted several relief measures, 
including, the CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, effective 
March 27, 2020.233 The CARES Act provided $139 billion in relief to be divided 
among state and local governments based on population.234 This relief is restricted to 
necessary expenditures incurred due to COVID-19, which were not accounted for in 
the state budget most recently approved as of March 27, 2020, and which were 
incurred between and including March and December of 2020.235 Illinois received 
$4.9 billion, with $3.5 billion going to the state itself and $1.4 billion directly going 
to five large counties and the City of Chicago.236 Whether any of this aid will go to 
state or local pension systems is not clear. The CARES act does not address public 
employee pensions.237 A review of the Treasury Department’s guidance does not 
yield a clear answer.238 However, a Treasury Department statement clarified that due 
to the emergency nature of the situation, a state or local government “may presume 
that payroll costs for public health and public safety employees are payments for 
services substantially dedicated to mitigating or responding to the COVID-19 public 
health emergency” and therefore are permissible under the CARES Act.239 It appears, 
then, that CARES Act aid may be used to support Illinois’ pension systems if Illinois’ 
leaders choose to put the funds to that use.240 Regardless, any aid given to 
municipalities would indirectly support the funding of pensions because it would 
open up general fund revenue to pay the required contributions. Reimbursement to 
municipalities means money available to the pensions. 
 
COVID-19-related aid explicitly intended for troubled pension plans is an idea being 
considered for the next COVID-19 relief act.241 On May 15, 2020 the House passed 
another relief measure, the Heroes Act would increase the solvency of multi-
employer plans and repeal some previous benefit suspensions.242 However, the 
White House has already pledged to veto the Heroes Act.243 
 
B. Ideological Opposition 
 
Another continuing challenge for pension funds will be the ideological struggle 
against the critics’ attempt to erase pension benefits, including by misrepresenting 
the fiscal health of the pension systems and the benefits the retirees receive. This 




attempt will receive a new rationalization every time an event of real or asserted 
economic importance occurs. Thus, in addition to its economic impact, COVID-19 
has also provided a rhetorical backdrop for additional attacks on pensions. In April, 
Illinois Senate President Don Harmon (D-Oak Park) wrote to Illinois’ congressional 
representatives and asked for, inter alia, $10 billion in COVID-19 relief for the state’s 
pension funds.244 Because the assets of most pension funds are heavily invested in a 
stock market that has recently plummeted, this money was badly needed and would 
offset an unanticipated economic decline. As Harmon clarified, “The massive 
negative effects [of COVID-19] to state and local economies across this country have 
not been addressed and need to be.”245 
 
For some reason, those who frequently decry the asserted ill health of the Illinois 
pension system also opposed the use of federal money to help that system. In an 
open letter to Harmon, U.S. Representative Darin LaHood (R-Peoria) claimed that 
“Illinois must reform its pension system to reduce long-term liabilities and make the 
system more equitable to the people of Illinois before federal money is used to 
support the pension system.”246 Rather than allocate the federal money to a pension 
system that has been (1) underfunded continuously for decades and (2) hit hard by a 
stock market downturn, LaHood suggested that the money be given directly to the 
cities.247 LaHood did not explain how “reduc[ing] long-term liabilities” would “make 
the system more equitable,” unless he believes that public-sector employees should 
join the many private sector workers whose pension benefits have already been 
devastated. 
 
But LaHood’s reaction was measured compared to others. The general reaction of 
Republicans was described as “furious.”248 The Chicago Tribune Editorial Board 
referred to Harmon’s request as “shameless,” “dishonest,” and “galling”; referred to 
the pension system as an “obvious drain on resources” and a “financial hellhole”; 
failed to address the effect of the Coronavirus-related recession on investment 
assets; and ignored the rights of pension recipients.249 A welcome counterweight 
came, surprisingly, from Crain’s, which acknowledged the need for Coronavirus 
relief for pension systems like Illinois’.250 But this perspective should not be 
controversial. Pension funds rely on investment returns as a source of income. When 
the stock market goes down, even temporarily, the current value of pension fund 
assets and expected returns both decrease. This increases unfunded liability, which 
is presumptively the enemy of many of the critics. So the pension funds can either 
seek increased municipal contributions during a recession, when a municipality is 
likely to receive less tax revenue, or they can receive third-party payments from the 
federal government. And as is always the case with pension funds, increased 
payments now will eliminate the need for greater payments in the future. Despite the 
fiscal soundness of this argument, it does not seem to be popular with those who 
preach fiscal soundness. 
 




C. Employer-Fund Relationships 
 
One aspect of Article 3 and 4 funding unaffected by the Consolidation Law is the 
mechanics by which each Downstate Fund receives its municipal contribution. The 
task of ensuring that a municipality actually makes its required contribution is 
unaffected by the Consolidation Law; it therefore remains with the local pension 
board.251 If a municipality fails to make its required contribution, the pension fund 
may file a complaint. The pension fund would fight an uphill battle, however; the 
Illinois Supreme Court has held that the question of how a pension fund is funded is 
a political one, and courts will not take action to protect beneficiaries unless the fund 
is on the verge of default or imminent bankruptcy.252 An Article 3 or 4 fund might 
reach a settlement with a delinquent municipality, but in that case would almost 
certainly settle for less than its statutory entitlement, years after that money was due, 
in a settlement agreement that the municipality might later breach.253  
One provision in both Articles 3 and 4 provides that if a municipality fails to make its 
required contribution, the pension board may certify the amount delinquent to the 
State Comptroller, who is tasked with intercepting state funds intended for the 
municipality and redirecting them to the pension fund.254 But this “intercept” 
provision also leads to lengthy legal proceedings. The pension fund-claimant must 
formally notify the Comptroller of the amount delinquent.255 “[A]s soon as is 
practicable” thereafter, the Comptroller must give notice to the municipality.256 The 
municipality then has 60 days to contest the amount owed.257 If it does, the 
Comptroller may seek more information from the pension fund, who is given 90 
days to respond.258 Once he or she has all the information necessary, the Comptroller 
issues a decision entitling the pension fund to a warrant for some, all, or none of 
what it has claimed.259 As an administrative decision, the Comptroller’s decision is 
subject to administrative review under the Administrative Review Law.260 Therefore, 
while this process appears streamlined, it is still subject to lengthy court proceedings 
if a municipality chooses to challenge any aspect of the Comptroller’s decision. 
Therefore, every legal avenue an Article 3 or 4 fund has against an undercontributing 
municipality is relatively slow, inefficient, and contributes to friction between the 
pension fund and the municipality.261 Finally, an award against a municipality might 
necessitate enforcement proceedings before a pension fund can actually recover what 
it is owed.262 
By contrast, the process authorized for the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund 
(“IMRF”), the pension system of municipal elected officials and non-sworn 
employees, is swift and certain. The IMRF essentially sends a receipt to each 
municipality, detailing the money it has already intercepted for the municipality’s 
share of contributions to IMRF.263 In light of the fact that municipal underfunding is 
the reason Article 3 and 4 funds are inadequately funded, the failure to provide a 
stronger intercept provision in the Consolidation Law similar to what the IMRF 
enjoys appears to be a missed opportunity. 




Underfunded Article 3 and 4 funds in economically distressed municipalities will 
continue to face challenges not addressed by the Consolidation Law. Indeed, the 
Consolidation Law explicitly states that assets will not be shared among Downstate 
Funds: each Downstate Fund will have its own “account” with each Consolidated 
Fund and no Downstate Fund will be credited with assets at the expense of 
another.264 Additionally, whether an Illinois municipality could file for federal 
bankruptcy is unclear, and it is also unclear what would happen to the pension 
benefits payable from the associated Article 3 and 4 funds.265 The Consolidation Law 
addresses this challenge only to the extent that eventual, expected greater returns on 
investment, and actuarial assumptions not made by the municipality, will place such 
pension funds in a better economic position. 
D. Tax Collection and Public Opinion 
Illinois’ tax system also represents a challenge, for multiple reasons. First, the state is 
only one of seven that has a flat personal income tax rate, rather than a graduated 
tax rate which applies a higher marginal rate to higher incomes.266 This flat income 
tax rate is enshrined in Illinois’ Constitution.267 A proposal to amend the constitution 
to eliminate this provision will appear on the ballot in November 2020.268 If the 
proposal passes, Illinois would have the authority to apply a higher marginal income 
tax rate. This might alleviate some of Illinois’ budget concerns, but there is no 
indication that any revenue would go toward any pension system, let alone an Article 
3 or 4 system. 
Second, Article 3 and 4 prescribe that municipal contributions to pension funds 
should be funded by property taxes.269 This has not changed under the new 
Consolidation Law. Property taxes are the most conspicuous form of taxes. Income 
taxes are deducted individuals’ paychecks, “depriving” them of money that they 
never had and are unlikely to miss. Sales taxes are imposed when a person is already 
purchasing something and merely “deprive” the purchaser of a small fraction of the 
purchase price. Income and sales taxes are relatively subtle in this regard. 
By contrast, a property tax imposes a cost that is neither a subtle reduction in 
income nor a minor fraction of an overall cost. Property taxes force tax payers to 
open their wallets specifically to pay that tax. Property taxes intrude upon their lives 
and demand they pay money that they likely intended to spend some other way. 
Funding a government program by property taxes likely makes that program less 
popular. Further, property values and rates of non-payment of property taxes vary 
considerably across the state and are dramatically affected by income inequality, 
leading to decreased funding in troubled communities. Finally, tying a program to a 
property tax makes it a candidate to be cut if and when the tax itself is cut. 
Since the property-tax-funding provisions of Article 3 and 4 are generally not 
enforced, it might be helpful to further deviate from this funding method, as some 
municipalities already have, and impose other income or sales taxes to generate the 
revenue to pay required contributions. Actions such as these should have a beneficial 








Illinois’ pension funds, including Article 3 and 4 pension funds, are not on the brink 
of failure. They are not a crisis. They are not an extreme burden. And the numbers 
trotted out as scare tactics are not accurate measures of the pension system’s health 
in the present or even the near future. However, serious underfunding problems 
have plagued the systems historically. The Consolidation Law will ameliorate 
problems to some degree, by generating greater returns on investment and by 
prohibiting untenable actuarial assumptions. But decades of underfunding will not 
be solved by a single law with a gradual effect. A serious political commitment must 
be made to funding pensions, with the knowledge that money paid now will generate 
investment returns and thus result in lower payments in the future. Whether the 
political will exists to allow greater enforcement of funding contributions remains to 
be seen. 
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Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public employee 
relations community.  
 




In City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police, 2020 IL 124831 (Ill. June 18, 2020), the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that an arbitration award that directed the City of Chicago 
and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to establish a procedure for the City to comply 
with Section 8.4 of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was contrary to public 
policy and, therefore, unenforceable. Section 8.4, provided for the destruction of 
Chicago police disciplinary records and related documents five years following the 
incident or the discovery of the violation.  Section 8.4 has been the subject of 
controversy since 1991, when a federal district judge ordered the City to cease destroying 
complaint register files; other judges hearing civil rights cases involving Chicago police 
followed suit. The City was unsuccessful in its subsequent attempts to eliminate Section 
8.4 from the CBA. 
 
In response to several requests for policy misconduct records under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), the City in 2014 informed the FOP of its intention to release 
records that, under the CBA, should have been destroyed. The FOP sought a preliminary 
injunction, which was granted by the circuit court, disallowing the release of any records 
more than four years old as of the date of the FOIA request. The City thereafter filed an 
interlocutory appeal. When the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) began 
investigating patterns of excessive force and discriminatory police practices in Chicago 
in December 2015, it requested that the City preserve all misconduct-related documents, 
including those that were the subject of the ongoing arbitration cases. The arbitrator 
shortly thereafter issued his original opinion calling for compliance with the CBA. 
In July 2016, the City filed a petition in the circuit court to vacate the arbitration award 
because it violated Illinois public policy pursuant to the Local Records Act, 50 ILCS 205, 
et seq.  The FOP filed a counter-petition, but in October 2017 the circuit court granted 
the City’s petition to vacate on the ground that enforcing the award violated the public 
policy to maintain public records. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the 
destruction of records was based not on the requisite consideration of whether the 
records have “ . . . administrative, legal, research or historical value . . . ”, 50 ILCS 




205/10, but rather on an arbitrary fixed period of time. The FOP appealed, and the 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision. 
The Illinois Supreme Court employed a two-step analysis developed in AFSCME v. 
Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 229, 671 N.E.2d 668 (1996), 
which asks whether a clearly defined and strong public policy can be identified in 
constitutional, statutory, or judicial authority and then determines whether the award in 
question violates the public policy. Looking to the plain language of the Local Records 
Act, the court found a clear public policy to preserve public records, with destruction 
becoming appropriate only after review by the Local Records Commission. The court 
found that the arbitration award violated the policy of the Local Records Act.  The court 
rejected the FOP’s efforts to reconcile the contractual clause with the Local Records Act 
because, although the City could begin to comply with the award by submitting the 
records to the Records Commission, it could not comply with the award and the law if 
the Commission refused to allow the records’ destruction. The court held that the Local 
Records Act and the contract were irreconcilable, as any denial of destruction by the 
Commission would run counter to the contract—and any attempt by the City to comply 
with the contract’s terms outside the Commission’s purview would be contrary to public 
policy. 
The court concluded that state law must prevail over contracts, as “[a] contract expressly 
prohibited by law is void, and there is no exception to this rule for the reason that a law 
cannot at the same time prohibit a contract and enforce it.” The court rejected the FOP’s 
argument that section 15 of the IPLRA requires giving effect to CBA provisions that 
conflict with state statutes. The court reasoned that such a holding would eliminate the 





In Carmen Rentas  and County of Cook, Health and Hospital System, Case No. L-CA-
19-078 (ILRB Local Panel June 19, 2020), the Local Panel affirmed the Executive 
Director’s dismissal of an unfair labor practice that alleged that Cook County Health 
retaliated against Rentas on the basis of “her race and/or national origin.” 
The Local Panel affirmed the Executive Director’s dismissal of the charge on the ground 
that the charging party failed to allege the Respondent took adverse action against her 
because she engaged in activities protected under the Act. The Executive Director noted 
that Charging Party alleged that the Respondent retaliated against her because “she 
made claims of gender, national origin, and age discrimination.” 
Finding the appeal without merit, the Local Panel noted that “[t]he Executive Director 
correctly determined that the Charging Party did not raise issues for hearing on the 
allegation that the Respondent retaliated against her for engaging in protected, 
concerted activity.” The Local Panel noted, “Even on appeal, the Charging Party 




describes her protected conduct as a complaint to ‘EEO Nick in HR’ and ‘complaint[s] to 
EEOC/IL[D]HR.’” (Alterations in original.) 
The Local Panel held: 
To raise issues for hearing on a retaliation claim arising under Section 10(a)(1) of 
the Act, the charging party must present some evidence on each element of her 
prima facie case, namely, that[:] (1) she engaged in union and/or protected, 
concerted activity, (2) the Respondent knew of that activity[;] (3) the Respondent 
took adverse action against her; and (4) her protected, concerted activity and/or 
union activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 
action.  
Here, the Charging Party alleged she was engaged in protected activity, suggested that 
the Operating Room Flow Coordinator, Cean Magosky, disciplined her with a one-day 
suspension, and proffered suspicious timing as evidence of a causal connection between 
her grievance and the adverse action. Regardless, the Local Panel held suspicious timing 
alone was not enough to “raise issues for hearing [under the Act].” Turning to the 
Charging Party’s remaining arguments for suspicious timing, the Local Panel further 
determined there was insufficient evidence, particularly here the Charging Party made a 
blanket assertion that the Respondent “knew of her protected activity,” and where  the 
Charging Party alleged she received two suspensions in retaliation but it was unclear 
whether those resulted from the grievances filed. 
For the forgoing reasons, the Local Panel affirmed the Executive Director’s dismissal. 
 
II. ILLINOIS SCHOOL CODE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
In Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020 IL 125062 (Ill.  
Apr. 16, 2020), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a teacher who gives birth at the 
end of one school year is not entitled under Illinois School Code to use her accrued paid 
sick leave at the start of a new school year. 
 
On March 15, 2016, Margaret Dynak, a full-time teacher employed by Wood Dale School 
District 7 (District), notified the District she was due to give birth on June 6, 2016. She 
requested to use 1.5 days of her accumulated paid sick leave on the last 1.5 days of the 
school year in June. She also requested to use 12 weeks of leave pursuant to the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, beginning the first day of the 2016-17 school year. Additionally, 
she requested to use paid sick leave for the first 28.5 days of her FMLA leave, allegedly 
pursuant to section 24-6 of the School Code. 
 
In Dynak, the court had to determine whether section 24-6 of the Illinois School Code, 
105 ILCS 5/24-6, allowed a teacher who gives birth at the end of the school year to use 
her accumulated paid sick leave at the start of the next school year. The school district 
denied Dynak’s request to use paid sick leave at the beginning of the new school year 
following, approximately two months after the birth, giving rise to the issue. Plaintiff 




filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of DuPage County, where 
the court held in favor of the school district; the Appellate Court affirmed.  
 
Section 24-6 defines sick leave for full-time teachers and certain school district 
employees in municipalities with populations of less than 500,000 people. 105 ILCS 
5/24-6. The statute provides that eligible employees shall be granted at least 10 paid sick 
days per school year, with the unused amount allowed to accumulate. Through a 
legislative amendment in 2007, “birth, adoption, or placement for adoption,” was added 
to the definition of sick leave.  Plaintiff interpreted the statute as allowing sick leave for 
birth to be open-ended and noncontinuous. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. 
 
The court determined the statute expressly limits a teacher's right to use paid sick leave 
for birth. Reading its plain terms, it provides “sick leave” to certain teachers and school 
employees for various events requiring employees to be absent from work. The court 
reasoned the statute includes “birth” in its list of events triggering a teacher's right to 
use her accumulated paid sick leave. Moreover, the court noted the statute even states 
that a medical certificate is required “as a basis for pay during leave after an absence of 
30 days for birth.” Ultimately, the court reasoned the language of the School Code 
strongly suggests that the legislature intended that “sick leave for birth must have a 
temporal connection to the birth.” Theretofore, the court deduced the 30-day 
requirement could only make sense if its intent was for paid sick leave to follow 
immediately after the birth. 
 
The court reinforced its understanding by considering that “birth” is contained within a 
group of other qualifying events, which also have a temporal connection. Finding “the 
most reasonable and consistent reading of the statute is [one] that it allows an employee 
who experiences a qualifying event to use accumulated paid sick leave at the time of that 
event, not later at the employee's discretion,” the court held for the District.  
Ultimately, the court held that under section 24-6, “[T]eachers may use up to 30 days of 
accumulated paid sick leave during the six-week period immediately following the 
birth.” (Emphasis in original.)  
 
III. WORKERS COMPENSATION DEVELOPMENTS 
 
On June 5, 2020, by Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker signed HB 2455 into law. The 
amendment to the workers compensation law creates a rebuttable presumption that an 
essential employee's contraction of Covid-19 occurred in the course of employment and 
therefore is eligible for workers' compensation benefits. 
 
The amendment applies to any first responder or front-line worker diagnosed with 
Covid-19 on or after March 9, 2020, and on or before December 31, 2020. The 
amendment specifies that the “presumption shall apply to any fireman [or policeman] 
who was exposed to and contracted COVID-19 on or after March 9, 2020, and  on or 
before December 31, 2020; except that the presumption shall not apply if the fireman 
[or policeman] was on a leave of absence from his or her employment or otherwise not 




required to report for duty for a period of 14 or more consecutive days immediately prior 
to the date of contraction of COVID-19.” 
 
The presumption only applies to workers who: required to interact with the public, or 
work with fifteen or more employees at their place of business. Except for home care 
workers, an employee's residence is not considered their place of business.  
Claimants must establish they contracted COVID-19 through a confirmed diagnosis 
from a licensed medical practitioner or a positive laboratory test for COVID-1 or COVID-
19 antibodies. The amendment extends the rebuttable presumption for ordinary death 
benefits related to death in the line of duty because of COVID-19. 
The employer may rebut the presumption by evidence, including but not limited to, the 
following: 
1. Compliance with the fullest extent practicable with applicable health and 
safety practices and guidance in the fourteenth days prior to the diagnosis 
2. Establishing the claimant contracted the virus somewhere else. 
3. Showing the claimant worked from home or was off work in the fourteen 
days prior to the diagnosis. 
Finally, an employer is entitled to a credit against any liability for temporary total 
disability due to an employee as a result of the employee contracting COVID-19 for (A) 
any sick leave benefits or extended salary benefits paid to the employee by the employer 
under Emergency Family Medical Leave Expansion Act, Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act 
of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, or any other federal law, or (B) any 
other credit to which an employer is entitled under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
 
